Introduction 44
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) currently lists nearly 39,000 45 impaired waterways (USEPA, 2006a), which have been submitted by state and other 46 governmental bodies in accordance with requirements in the 1972 U.S. Clean Water Act 47 (USEPA, 2006b). In response, Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) have been or must be 48 developed for each of these impaired water bodies which: (1) establish the maximum level of a 49 pollutant(s) that must be maintained to still meet water quality standards, and (2) also allocates 50 pollutant loadings among sources (USEPA, 2006b). Application of a TMDL requires 51 subsequent implementation of recommendations generated during the TMDL process, with the 52 attainment of the desired water quality standard being the ultimate goal. There are a wide 53 variety of policy instruments that can be used to support the TMDL implementation process 54
and other water quality initiatives. Water quality trading is one of the policy tool options which 55 has received considerable attention in recent years (USEPA, 2004) . 56
Delivery coefficients, which are simple parameters used to capture the impacts of land 57 uses, can potentially be used to support the design and implementation of policies aimed for 58 water quality improvement.
1 As early as the 1970s, economists used delivery coefficients to 59 study how market based mechanisms can be utilized to minimize the cost of pollutant 60 abatement (Montgomery, 1972) . Recently, Khanna et al. (2003) used delivery coefficients to 61 assess the costs of pollution control in a watershed in Illinois. Horan et al. (2004) further 62 applied delivery coefficients to examine the coordination and design of water quality trading 63 programs and agri-environmental policies. A permit trading system, where trading ratios were 64 determined by delivery coefficients, was shown to be able to achieve the least cost to reach a 65
Theoretical Modeling Framework 111
Suppose there is a goal of reducing nutrient loading at the watershed outlet 112
by N kilograms for a watershed divided into J subwatersheds. Let the cost of nutrient 113 application reduction be ( ) j j j C N A , where j N is the nutrient application reduction in kilograms 114 per hectare, and j A is the total hectares in subwatershed j. The effect of nutrient application 115 reduction at all subwatersheds (i.e., the total nutrient loading reduction at the watershed outlet) 116
is represented by a function that is, the overall reduction in nutrient loading has to exceed a preset standard N . 122
In this study, we explore a linear approximation of where j d , the delivery coefficient for subwatershed j, provides an approximation of the amount 125 of nutrient loading reduction at the watershed outlet achieved by one unit of nutrient 126 application reduction in the subwatershed j. The main subject of this paper is to examine 127 whether allocations based on this simplified version of ( ) f i achieve water quality standards. In 128 other words, our goal is to examine the validity of using j d as an intermediary between policy 129 making and biophysical models that attempt to mimic the whole hydrological process in a 130
watershed. 131
The constraint in (1) can be satisfied by many different sets of j N for 1, 2,..., j J = , each 132 of which will have a different total cost, 1 ( )
. As we discussed in the 133
Introduction, different principles can be used to determine j N . For the absolute equity 134 principle, then j N can be set equal for all j or it can be set such that every subwatershed has 135 equal percentage reduction. For the geographic proximity, some subwatersheds, i.e., a subset of 136 {1,2,…J}, will be identified as being close to the watershed outlet. Denote this subset as 137 {downstream}, then one example allocation can be set as follows: 0
. For critical area targeting, a subset of 139 subwatersheds, denoted as {critical}, will be identified and then load reduction responsibilities 140 can be allocated similarly: 0
Unlike equal allocation and downstream targeting where information on the function 142 ( ) f i is not necessary, some information on ( ) f i is usually required in order to identify the 143 critical areas. If we know j d for all subwatersheds, then we can designate those with higher 144 ' j d s as critical areas. As we discussed in the Introduction, the equity based on ability principle 145 can require those with lower marginal costs of reduction to cut back more of their nutrient 146 application. As is well known in the economics literature, such requirement will be met by the 147 least cost allocation which is a solution to the following problem, 148 
represents the 154 marginal benefit, i.e., the extra loading reduction achieved from an incremental change in j N . 155 Equation (4) requires that the ratio of marginal cost over the marginal benefit be equalized to 156 achieve the least cost allocation. 157
Theoretically, we can obtain the least-cost allocation by solving j N for 1,..., j J = from 158 equations (1) and (4) with (1) binding (i.e., the nutrient reduction standard will be just met). Some states still recommend more fertilizer for a higher yield goal, while others have 175 discontinued the practice (Lory and Scharf, 2003) . It is difficult to estimate the impacts of 176 fertilizer application because the effects may be masked by weather, previous crops, soil 177 condition, etc. Moreover, the reduction of fertilizer may have an insignificant effect in the short 178 run; however, the long run effect may be large. In addition to the issues related to yield effects, 179
Babcock [1992] also showed that the seemingly over-application of nitrogen fertilizer is 180 actually consistent with profit maximization, which implies that a payment will be needed for 181 farmers to reduce their nitrogen fertilizer application. In our study, different parameter values 182 will be examined to represent the spectrum of estimates regarding the cost of nutrient 183 application reduction. 184
With (2) and (5), we can derive a closed form solution for the problem in (3) as follows: 
192
This not only facilitates our empirical analysis but also is important in the real world policy 193 assessment given that the exact magnitude of cost for nutrient reduction can be hard to obtain. 194
The implementation of * area and about two thirds of the total cropland area in a given year, which was consistent with 256 the fact that corn-soybean was the dominant rotation in the watershed and other rotations also 257 included corn. The fertilizer application rates in the region, which were based on state and 258 county fertilizer use information, had a mean of 148 kg/ha and a standard deviation of 4.7 kg/ha. 259 260
Empirical Analysis 261
In this section, we first describe the procedure used to obtain delivery coefficients and 262 then we explain the alternative allocations of nutrient reduction responsibilities in the 263 watershed. In our empirical modeling, we chose nitrate as our nutrient indicator since it was the 264 predominant form of water pollution in the study region. We chose nitrogen fertilizer 265 application reduction as the pollution control measure given that it was a practice 266 recommended by the CENR (Mitsch et al., 1999) and was also most straightforward to model. 267
The following procedure was used to obtain the delivery coefficient In the comparison of the four allocations, (i) was used as a benchmark. In other words, we first 290 derived the water quality results from (i) through SWAT simulation. Then, allocations were 291 made for (ii)-(iv), assuming that the nitrate loading reduction, estimated from the delivery 292 coefficients, was fixed at the same level as that achieved by (i). SWAT simulations were then 293 used to assess how water quality outcomes from (ii)-(iv) compared to that from (i). All SWAT 294 simulations were performed for the same time period as the baseline (1981-2003) ; the annual 295 average nitrate output was used for estimating the subwatershed nitrate loads for each scenario. 296
Allocations in (ii)-(iv) result in greater nitrogen reductions in some subwatersheds 297 relative to others. Thus, it is an important issue as to how sensitive the delivery coefficients are 298 to different degrees of nitrogen application reduction. To gain some insight on this issue, three 299 application reduction levels were considered: 10, 20, and 30%. In the rest of the paper, we will 300 call these the 10%, 20%, or 30% scenarios, respectively. In the 10% scenarios, the delivery sensitive to tillage practices, we derived delivery coefficients when no till was adopted on all 334
cropland. The distribution of the new delivery coefficients resembled that in Figure 3 and thus 335
is not presented here. The average of the new delivery coefficients was 0.26, which was only 336 slightly higher than the delivery coefficients presented in Figure 3 . The result that the delivery 337 coefficients were also quite robust in relation to different tillage practices also indicates their 338 utility for supporting policy design and implementation. 339 340
Assessing delivery coefficients as a tool to allocate nutrient reduction responsibilities 341
After the delivery coefficients were derived, allocations were made as described in the 342 previous section. For all allocations (i)-(iv), Table 2 provides the nitrogen reduction rates for 343 each subwatershed and the resulting nitrate loading reduction at the watershed outlet. Given 344 that the results for all three percentage scenarios were similar, only the 20% scenario is 345 presented in the table. For the equal allocation scenario, the nitrate loading reduction achieved 346 at the watershed was 17.13% as estimated by SWAT simulation. This achievement was then 347 used as a goal for allocations (ii)-(iv). 348
For critical area targeting, we assume that subwatersheds that had delivery coefficients 349 greater than the median should be managed with reduced nitrogen fertilizer application. There 350 were 13 such subwatersheds, specifically, {critical}= {2,3,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,13,15,19,26}. For all 351 three percentage scenarios, the average delivery coefficient for subwatersheds in {critical} was 352 0.28, while the average for all others was 0.18. For simplicity, the allocation among critical 353 subwatersheds was set equal and no nitrogen reduction was required at other subwatersheds. Table 2 shows that 0.3165 z =
. That is, critical subwatersheds would be required to 361 make about 32% reduction in fertilizer application in order for the nitrate loading at watershed 362 outlet, as calculated from delivery coefficients, to be reduced by 17.13%. Running SWAT 363 simulations for the allocation, we found that the nitrate loading reduction was actually 16.14%, 364 lower than the target (17.13%) the allocation was assumed to achieve. which is the same as (7) except that {downstream} replaces {critical}. The fourth column of 377 Table 2 shows that 0.4386 z =
. Based on SWAT simulation outputs for the allocation, the 378 nitrate loading reduction at the watershed outlet was only 15.42%, which was lower than the 379 target (17.13%) the allocation was meant to achieve. 380
For the least-cost allocations, the per hectare nitrogen application rate in each 381 subwatershed was given by equation (6). One least-cost allocation is presented in Table 2 . 382 (More least-cost allocations are discussed in the next subsection.) We can make two 383 observations on the last column of the table. First, the allocation was quite uneven among the 384 subwatersheds ranging from 8.87% for subwatershed 18 to 41.22% for subwatershed 26. 385 Second, the nitrate reduction achieved (17%) was very close to the goal that the allocation was 386 meant to achieve. 387
These observations are also applicable to the allocations based on downstream targeting 388 and critical area targeting. All allocations in the last three columns of Table 2 were designed to 389 achieve the same nitrate loading reduction as the equal allocation; i.e., all cells in the last row 390 should be equal to 17.13%. The last two rows of Table 2 show that the allocations based on 391 delivery coefficients came very close to achieving the initial nitrate reduction goal. The largest 392 deviation occurred in the downstream targeting allocation, which resulted in a nitrate loading 393 that was about 10% short of the reduction goal. 7 These results provide supporting evidence that 394 it was not unreasonable to use delivery coefficients as a tool for allocation, at least for the 395 watershed analyzed in this study. 396 397
Comparing the four principles of allocation 398
While our main purpose was to assess the delivery coefficients as a tool for nitrate 399 allocation, we can also provide some insights on the cost-effectiveness of the four principles 400 that were used as criteria for allocation in our analysis. Reducing nitrogen fertilizer in the 401 downstream subwatersheds was slightly more effective overall, as indicated by the slightly 402 higher average delivery coefficients of these subwatersheds. However, focusing on nitrogen 403 fertilizer reduction in downstream subwatersheds could be more expensive especially when the 404 abatement costs rise fast. For example, for 1 θ = (i.e., abatement cost is quadratic and increases 405 relatively fast), the total cost for downstream targeting could be twice as expensive as the equal 406 allocation. However, for 5 θ = (i.e., abatement cost was closer to being linear), the cost 407 difference between the two scenarios would be reduced dramatically to a few percentage points. 408
Even though the delivery coefficients were much higher for the critical subwatersheds 409 than for other subwatersheds, critical area targeting could still be more expensive than equal 410 allocation if cost increases fast. This is mainly because the impacts of the delivery coefficients 411
were linear as reflected in (7). In our simulation, for function across the subwatersheds. Given that there was not enough information on the 425 abatement costs, we conducted some sensitivity analyses and presented the results in Table 3 . 426
The table indicates that the three reduction levels had about the same cost savings, which were 427 quite small, about 5% for 1 θ = . However, for slower rising costs the savings could be as high 428 as about 11.5%. 429
Heterogeneity in cost is a major reason for cost savings from least-cost programs 430 (Newell and Stavins, 2003) . Three sets of values were examined for the heterogeneity 431 parameter j γ . In the first one, there was no heterogeneity, i.e., j γ was equal for all j . In the 432 second set, there was some heterogeneity and j γ was drawn from a transformed Beta 433 distribution with a sample mean of 3.5 and a standard deviation of 0.8. In the last set, there was 434 more heterogeneity-j γ was drawn from a similarly transformed Beta distribution with about 435 the same sample mean but a standard deviation 75% larger. Table 3 shows that, when the 436 variance of the heterogeneity parameter increased by 75%, the cost savings more than doubled. 437
Nevertheless, such savings are quite modest compared to the SO2 trading program which was 438 estimated to be about 40% cheaper than "command and control" regulations (Carlson et al., 439 2000) . 440 441
CONCLUSIONS 442
In this study, we assessed the utility of using delivery coefficients as an implementation 443 tool for polices aimed at improving water quality. The delivery coefficients were examined as a 444 bridge between a complex water quality model and policy making. On the one hand, the 445 delivery coefficients were calculated from SWAT model simulation outputs and the impacts of 446 allocations were also assessed by SWAT simulations. On the other hand, the alternative 447 allocations were made directly based on the delivery coefficients and the SWAT model plays 448 no direct role in making the allocations. In our study region, we found that allocations based on 449 the coefficients had water quality results that were close to the goals they were set out to 450
achieve. This finding indicates that delivery coefficients can be a useful tool in the 451 implementation of water quality policies. In addition to being directly used as a targeting tool, 452 the delivery coefficients will be especially important in water quality trading programs where 453 they can be utilized to set the trading ratios among different polluting sources. 454
A markup (or markdown) in the policy goals can be used in the spirit of a margin of 455 safety if implementation based on delivery coefficients tends to systematically under-achieve 456 (or over-achieve) water quality goals. Moreover, for a specific watershed, the deviation from 457 water quality goals should also be put in perspective. For example, the deviation can be 458 contrasted with potential cost savings from implementing policies based on the coefficients. In 459 our study, in which we simulated the cost savings of allocations based on different principles, 460
we found that the extent of cost savings was much larger than the extent of non-attainment of 461 water quality goals. Given the potential of policies such as water quality trading as a cost-462 effective approach to cleaner water, and the relatively little extra costs of developing the 463 delivery coefficients, it is likely that many watersheds can find it beneficial to test the utility of 464 delivery coefficients. 465
Appendix: Derivation of the mathematical results in (4) and (6) 466
We can write the Lagrangian function of (3) as follows ( λ is the Lagrange multiplier), For the analysis to be interesting, we assume interior solutions, i.e, 
